By David J. Lonsdale
This booklet bargains a strategic research of 1 of the main remarkable army careers in background, settling on the main pertinent strategic classes from the campaigns of Alexander the nice.
David Lonsdale argues that because the center ideas of procedure are everlasting, the research and research of historic examples have price to the trendy theorist and practitioner. in addition, as method is so complicated and hard, the amazing occupation of Alexander offers the appropriate chance to appreciate most sensible perform in technique, as he accomplished notable and non-stop luck around the spectrum of war, in quite a few situations and environments. This booklet provides the 13 so much pertinent classes that may be realized from his campaigns, dividing them into 3 different types: grand process, army operations, and use of strength. each one of those different types offers classes pertinent to the trendy strategic setting. finally, even though, the publication argues that the dominant think about his good fortune was once Alexander himself, and that it was once his personal features as a strategist that allowed him to beat the complexities of procedure and attain his expansive objectives.
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This ebook bargains a strategic research of 1 of the main extraordinary army careers in background, choosing the main pertinent strategic classes from the campaigns of Alexander the nice. David Lonsdale argues that because the center rules of approach are everlasting, the examine and research of historic examples have price to the fashionable theorist and practitioner.
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Additional info for Alexander the Great: Lessons in Strategy
Thus, one could identify a key enemy airfield as the operational level centre of gravity. In addition, at the level of strategy/grand strategy the centre of gravity may be the leadership or the public will. 101 For Clausewitz, the key candidates for centres of gravity are, depending upon the context, the army, capital cities, public will, alliance cohesion, or personalities of the leadership. 102 As with all theoretical concepts in strategy, the practical realisation of them is the real challenge.
Surely more damage could be inflicted on the enemy, and therefore there was more chance for achieving a decision, with the continued use of spear and sword, rather than merely relying on pushing one’s foe from the field. This approach also seems to represent a more likely evolution from the Homeric form of battle. During this earlier period, the formations were much more open and fluid. Battle tended to be characterised by a fluctuating front line in which each side would engage in a series of charges, during which individuals would attempt to dispatch an opponent from the opposing side.
However, in a more general sense the scale of the Persian wars placed a greater emphasis on a variety of forces operating in a range of environments. For example, the poorer sections of society, who had been excluded from hoplite warfare, were now required to man the Athenian fleet. 54 The Peloponnesian War was even more significant in the evolution away from classical hoplite warfare. The two main protagonists in this war, Athens and Sparta, were diametrically opposed in their strategic culture and strengths.